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This paper explores the role of bandits and state intervention in the Ottoman Balkans 
and Southern Italy in the 19th century by using archival documents. I argue that the 
states may react similarly and radically when their authority is challenged in the 
periphery. The Ottoman Empire and the Kingdom of Italy developed the same forms of 
state intervention to fight against the bandits, even though these two states had 
fundamentally different political, cultural, and socio-legal structures. I present three 
different forms of state intervention: (i) victim-centred state intervention; (ii) security-
centred state intervention; and (iii) authority-centred state intervention. These three 
forms consolidated the state’s authority while making the two states both fragile and 
dependent on other social agencies in the long term. I further claim that consolidation 
of the state’s authority manifests the paradox of state intervention and creates more 
vulnerabilities in traumatic geographies. 
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1 | INTRODUCTION  
Peasant society is a sociocultural laboratory in which to explore banditry as a social 
phenomenon. The social conditions of peasants, inequalities in everyday life, and the 




governance have rendered banditry a formidable practice across many different peasant 
societies. Banditry has been subjected to both romantic and realist attempts to construe 
its meaning. Hence, it has been one of the most widely used concepts in the exploration 
of crime, conflict, state-building processes, violence, and atrocities, particularly in the 
19th century, when nationalism, industrial revolution, and a new international order set 
the agenda of major sociopolitical institutions at the national and international level 
(Arlacchi, 1983; Beaton, 1980; Cassia, 1993; Curott & Fink, 2012; Esmer, 2014; 
Hobsbawm, 1959; Schneider & Schneider, 2008). These developments in the 19th 
century reverberated through the role of bandits, who brought dramatic changes into 
rural life and challenged state authority at the same time. The rise of nationalism in the 
19th century convulsed multi-ethnic countries, as happened in the Ottoman Empire 
when different ethnic and religious groups began to defy Ottoman rule in earnest. On 
the other hand, nationalism encouraged more interconnected communities to become 
unified—sometimes even forcefully—under the rule of a mighty power, as happened 
in the foundation of the Kingdom of Italy, as a result of initiatives led by the Kingdom 
of Sardinia, the House of Savoy, and an intellectual group that had gathered around the 
ideals of Italian patriotism (Clark, 2009; Davis, 1988).  
We still know very little about the commonalities and distinctions of bandits 
within the broad spectrum of state intervention in diverse sociocultural geographies. 
Illuminating the relationship between state intervention and bandits in these two 
different regions will help us to understand the characteristic milieus of rural dissent, 
the reaction of society, and the forms of state intervention. The present paper aims to 
delve into a number of cases that shook the social and political order of the Ottoman 
Balkans and Southern Italy in the 1850s and the following two decades. The perplexing 
and tense sociopolitical panorama after the second half of the 19th century was subject 
to the deep influence of social and political transformations, in both the Ottoman 
Balkans and in Southern Italy, as a result of state restoration and the process of state 
formation, respectively, in these two territories. The notorious prevalence of bandits in 
the 19th century created both parallel motives and diversifications in the emergence of 
bandits and the position of state authority to deal with banditry activities, which became 
a marginalized social problem. The lack of comparative banditry studies exploring the 
status of banditry and its implications in different societies creates an enigma in the 
state–community nexus of contentious societies. The principal aim of this paper, 




of state intervention, which were aimed at the eradication of bandits, in the Ottoman 
Empire and the Kingdom of Italy. Our responses to the questions raised in this paper 
will depict the role of state intervention when the great dissent in the periphery was 
echoed in the decisions of central governments to suppress the bandits. 
The archival materials that I examined in this study were derived from two main 
repositories. The Ottoman sources were derived from the Prime Minister’s Ottoman 
Archives (Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi) in Istanbul, while for the Italian sources I 
consulted the archives of the Institute for the History of Risorgimento (L’Istituto per la 
Storia del Risorgimento Italiano), based in the Museo Centrale Risorgimento in Rome. 
The archival documents in this study, presented in footnotes, were mostly dated from 
the 1850s to the 1870s. I mainly endeavour to clarify the reactions of the two states, 
which had different political and socio-legal structures, against the bandits. How was 
this reaction shaped according to the principal concerns and implications of state 
intervention? Finally, what were the outcomes of these interventions with regard to the 
various segments of society? The responses to these three questions also raised three 
main arguments in this research. First, the states, which have different political and 
socio-legal structures, devise similar responses to the social agencies when state 
authority perceives a severe risk directed against its existence. Second, I identify three 
main state intervention models applied by the Ottoman and Italian states to eliminate 
the bandits: (i) victim-centred state intervention; (ii) security-centred state intervention; 
and (iii) authority-centred state intervention. All these three interventions fostered the 
consolidation of the state’s authority in the Ottoman Empire and the Kingdom of Italy. 
Finally, none of these three forms of state intervention targeted the core social concerns 
of the rural communities to eliminate the source of the great dissent. As a result, this 
failure to eliminate the source of the problem created the paradox of state intervention, 
which signifies the consolidation of the state’s authority while, in the long term, 
creating more vulnerabilities for the rural communities.  
There are five main sections in the remaining part of the paper. The following 
theoretical section explores state intervention and bandits, as well as the historical 
context of banditry and statehood in the Ottoman Balkans and Southern Italy 
respectively. Next, the rural dissent in the Italian and Ottoman cases is considered in 
line with the global developments of the 19th century. In the following two sections, I 
examine the Ottoman and Italian archival documents that revolve around three main 




draw attention to the role of social injustice and its outcomes. I underscore why it is 
important to explore the cultural imperatives of comparative research in society and 
history in future studies. 
 
2 | STATE INTERVENTION AND BANDITS 
According to Hobsbawm (1959, 2000 [1969]), a social bandit does not merely 
symbolize a powerful social character governing the socio-economic life and cultural 
conflicts within a community. A social bandit is also a local figure who uses his power 
to bring about “justice” or to retaliate in the name of the powerless. However, the cases 
that I present below convey the message that the definition of social banditry is highly 
problematic. The negative and positive connotations of social banditry depend on the 
historical and local particularities of a social setting and the perceptions of local people 
about particular individual bandits or groups of bandits. For instance, one of the well-
known bandits in Southern Italy was Giuseppe Nicola Summa, who was mostly known 
as “Ninco Nanco”. He strictly prohibited the members of his bandit group from 
threatening the poor for purposes of extortion, while regularly demanding ransoms from 
the nobles of the region (Bianchi, 1903). On the other hand, many bandit groups 
terrorized the villages and extorted from the poor even though they shared the same 
social and cultural habitus with their victims. This is the reason why every bandit group 
is a social formation and has commonalities when the principal issue is misgovernance 
and injustice in that social context. 
Tilly (1985, p. 170) argued that legitimacy is gained through wars in the state-
making process, so that banditry and war-making can be located on the same 
continuum. Tilly (1985) also drew attention to a connection between the credibility of 
violence and the perpetuators of violence, whether it is applied by a legitimate actor, 
such as state, or an illegitimate actor. This explains why the Ottoman and Italian states 
treated some of the peasants in the name of public safety as if they were “criminals” 
and “barbarians”. The anthropological perspectives, on the other hand, inform us that 
agrarian resistance is highly related to development in a rural setting, and to the struggle 
to survive in respect of the land, on which the peasants have set their hopes for the 
future (Scott, 1985; Smith, 1989).  
The three models of state intervention analysed in this study demonstrate that 
states may engage in a paradoxical situation when state authority follows the trajectory 




paradox of state intervention occurs when a social problem sustains itself in either the 
same or a new structure, even if state authority deploys different forms of intervention, 
and uses both soft and hard power to tackle that social problem. However, different 
forms of state intervention foster the consolidation of the state’s authority while 
rendering the main source of the social problem either unfixed or transformed into a 
new guise. The same social problem and its new variants widen the scope of 
victimization among the powerless, whereas state authority emerges as a recognized 
force and engages in collaborations with the new social agencies or the variants of 
former local forces—as long as state authority assures its superiority. Turning to our 
case, the cases presented in this study show that the Ottoman and Italian state authorities 
employed different forms of state intervention and used soft power through social 
protection. Yet the soft power had little influence on the elimination of bandits, as it 
primarily addressed the suffering of victims after they had been attacked by bandits 
through the victim-centred state intervention model. Both states also used soft and hard 
power together in security-centred state intervention. Nevertheless, different from 
victim-centred state intervention, they achieved the elimination of a number of bandits 
through the law enforcement agencies. Finally, the elimination of bandits reached its 
peak with authority-centred state intervention, which not only wiped out a significant 
number of bandits but also increased the numbers of civilian victims greatly by 
destroying an entire village that did not accept the state as a superior authority.  
Not even the highest numbers of bandit eliminations, however, could guarantee 
the complete eradication of the source of the social problem. More fundamentally, the 
vulnerabilities of the peasants persisted with the state intervention. The paradox of state 
intervention, therefore, explains how the state gains social control in the periphery 
while, ironically, its authority depends on other social agencies. In fact, this shows us 
that a recognized authority can hold fragile power at the same time. Furthermore, social 
injustice in the periphery sustained itself through state incapacity. This was the reason 
why mafia-type syndicates appeared, given the vacuum of brigandage and banditry in 
the Italian context, shortly after the completion of the unification process in the 1870s. 
Similarly, in the Ottoman context, the source of the social problem was fuelled by ethnic 
and religious conflicts that also resulted in the full independence of a number of nations 
in the last quarter of the 19th century in the Ottoman Balkans. 
The bandits prevailed as social agents who held influential local power and 




authorities, on both sides of the Adriatic Sea, engaged in reforms to defeat the bandits, 
who posed a high risk to the subjects of the two states, and to public safety, and who 
even aimed at delegitimizing the social and political order in these two countries. Yet 
we need to explore the historical context of banditry and statehood in the Ottoman 
Empire and Southern Italy before the presentation of archival materials. 
 
3 | REVISITING THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF BANDITRY IN THE 
OTTOMAN BALKANS AND SOUTHERN ITALY 
3.1 | The historical context in the Ottoman Balkans 
Şaki—eşkiya in the plural—is the key term used by the Ottoman authorities to indicate 
bandits and brigands. Şaki etymologically signifies a desperate or miserable person; 
however, it gained a more negative connotation since it was mostly used for bandits. In 
addition to eşkiya, klephts demonstrated a traditional banditry character in the rural and 
mountainous areas of Ottoman Greece. The klephts became a social problem even after 
Greece gained its full independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1829: “The klephts 
were mainly fugitives, debtors, outlaws, misfits, adventurers, victims of oppression, 
men not attached to the land by property or other obligations, who took to the hills and 
became brigands” (Koliopoulos, 1989, p. 195). Similar to the klephts, hajduks were 
also used as popular aspirations to point out the bandits in both the Ottoman Empire 
and the Eastern Europe (Petrović, 2003). These multilayered facets of bandits made 
them part of a complex and difficult social problem. Nevertheless, what makes banditry 
a perplexing concept lies in the diverse characters and activities of the bandits, which 
included positive attributes such as resisting oppressors or fighting for justice. On the 
other hand, certain bandits also committed heinous crimes and consolidated their 
authority through ravaging and intimidation. As a result, eşkiya, hajduks or klephts were 
formidable figures in a rural community that was subjected to social injustice, public 
uncertainty, social isolation, and a vacuum of authority from time to time. Yet it is 
necessary to revisit the historical roots and social conditions of rural dissent to locate 
the bandits legitimately in the transforming social and political dynamics of the 
Ottoman Empire in the 19th century.  
The socio-economic and political decline after the Russo-Turkish wars of the 
18th and 19th centuries made discernible the urgent need for major agrarian reform. 
Furthermore, each failed reform package prompted a flood of angry responses from the 




a period of state centralization (Quataert, 2000, p. 54). The gradual but deepening 
degradation in social life was conflated with the rise of corruption in the many parts of 
the country, including the Balkans, from the early 19th century onwards (Kasaba, 1988, 
p. 58). Some of the responses of the troubled people in the rural communities had used 
violence as a strategic instrument, directed against the Ottoman local elites and rulers, 
in the 18th century. This resistance had introduced repressive, deterrent, and oppressive 
methods into the sphere of public life in order to end the social tumult in the rural areas 
of the Balkans. Those revolts were sometimes perceived by the local rulers as attempts 
by the Sultan’s subjects to resist his “holy” authority (Ursinus, 2005). This formidable 
social dissent did not terminate in the 19th century. In fact, the situation deteriorated 
further, as the uprisings gained the support of certain ethnic bandit members to resist 
the Ottoman Empire. On the other hand, the Ottoman official forces hired and used 
bandits as an irregular militia, known as bashibozuks (literally, “crazy-heads”), to 
repress the dissent in the rural areas (Özcan, 1986, p. 130). Consequently, an important 
segment among those who were resisting were labelled as looters and bandits, 
particularly by the appointed local governors when their higher social status was tested 
against these attempted uprisings. 
Through an examination of a number of archival resources related to bandits 
during the Tanzimât era, I have found that banditry activities increased exponentially 
while the Tanzimât reforms were striving to keep the Empire united, integrated, and 
more prosperous. The rise of nationalism was a major risk posed by the differing ethnic 
bandits against the rule of the Ottoman Empire, so nationalism was a stimulating aspect 
that brought the fight of the various ethnic groups to the fore. The uprisings by bandits 
who were part of diverse ethnic groups, such as Greeks, Serbs, Bulgarians, Bosnians, 
Montenegrins, Macedonians, and Albanians, was appreciated from time to time by their 
own rural communities, with growing support particularly during the second half of the 
19th century. However, in addition to these national and religious insurgents, an 
important part of the rural dissent and the attacks of the bandits was the source of social 
injustice (Inalcik, 1964). In fact, the drafters of the Tanzimât reforms were aware of the 
prevalent social injustice. The economy of the state was primarily based on agricultural 
products and land tenures, so much so that the administrative governance and tax 
collection were enmeshed in the authority of one man—in other words, the mutesellim. 
The infamous authority of the mutesellim (mültezim) was finally abolished in 1842 due 




of the mutesellim were transferred to the mutasarrıf in 1864 (Karpat & Zens, 2003, p. 
16).  
The Tanzimât reforms, which began with the Edict of Gülhane in 1839 and 
continued up to the declaration of the first Ottoman constitution in 1876, fostered hopes 
of bringing newfangled solutions to bear on the grim social problems and the political 
hubbub. The reaction of the peasants against the violation of the reform packages 
resonated through the 1841 Niš uprising (Uzun, 2002) and the Vidin uprising in 1849 
(Inalcik, 1964). These two attempts at resistance were the most important symbols of 
the rural dissent, in which the bandits played an important role in the surge of uprisings 
and its spread. Yet the Porte had to cope with a more challenging situation when the 
bandits played an even greater role through the revolts in Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
the uprisings of the Bulgarian community in the following decades. Additionally, the 
rural communities also sought, through aggressive and unyielding efforts, to negotiate 
with those implementing the complex and sometimes contradictory Tanzimât reforms 
in the periphery (Petrov, 2004). The archival documents cited in the following sections 
show that differing state interventions resonated in the periphery to different degrees. 
The three main forms of state intervention—victim-centred, security-centred, and 
finally authority-centred—endeavoured to overcome the rural dissent while fighting the 
bandits and consolidating the state’s authority.  
 
3.2 | The historical context in Southern Italy 
I briganti and i banditi are the two terms that were mostly used by the Italian state to 
refer to the brigands and bandits, respectively. In addition to the common use of 
brigands and bandits, the Italian archives examined in this study mostly mentioned I 
malfattori (evildoers), i male intenzionati (the malicious ones), i barbari (the 
barbarians), or i malviventi, which literally signifies those who live in a bad or evil way, 
while narrating different cases related to the bandits. Unsurprisingly, similar to the 
Ottoman state discourse, the various words used to imply banditry demonstrate the 
negative connotations in the vision of the Italian state with regard to bandits and 
brigands.  
Brigandage has a long pedigree in various parts of Southern Italy, from the 15th 
century onwards (Ciconte, 2011; Santino, 2000). On the other hand, similar to the 
Ottoman case, the prevalence of bandits in the 19th century was related to the lack of 




transformation. Yet the rural areas in Southern Italy were structured by idiosyncratic 
circumstances. In this regard, and unlike the Ottoman Mediterranean and the Balkan 
region, state centralization was weaker, and there was no effective police force in the 
rural parts of Southern Italy in the first half of the 19th century (Fiume, 1984, p. 109). 
Yet, more dramatically, the region deteriorated socio-economically because social 
injustice and rural dissent were rampant both before and after Italian unification 
(Gaudioso, 2002; Massari, 1961, p. 93). Unlike the Ottoman Balkans, feudalism 
flourished as a mode of government in Sicily until the early 19th century. Even though 
the Bourbon rulers of the Kingdom of Sicily abolished feudalism in 1812, they could 
not engender significant changes in the degenerating social conditions of the peasants 
(Mack Smith, 1965, p. 90). The blockage of a new and democratic constitution by 
Ferdinand IV of Naples and the ongoing social dissent among the rural communities 
united the nobles and peasants against the rule of the Bourbon Kingdom (Scianò, 2004). 
The various attempted uprisings led by the peasants of Sicily, starting particularly in 
the early 19th century, intensified after the 1830s. The death of Ferdinand IV of Naples 
in 1859 spurred a new social and political phase for the unification of Italy.  
The invasion of Sicily by Garibaldi in 1860, with 1,000 ambitious volunteers 
accompanying him, known as the “Expedition of the Thousand” (Italian, Spedizione dei 
Mille), leveraged public panic, fostered some hopes, and at the same time crystallized 
the grievous social problems of Sicily among the different sectors of society. 
Conversely, the new state formation and repressive policies in Southern Italy geared 
those lingering social problems towards reproducing their new forms within a culturally 
marginalized and politically fragile conundrum. The Southern Question was part of that 
conundrum. Indeed, the Southern Question, as a holistic term, was invented and used 
commonly in the late 19th century to express the historical, economic, and social 
problems of Southern Italy, while a number of reform packages were dealing with 
uncertainty and the status quo in the region (Dickie 1999; Moe 2002; Romano 1966; 
Schneider 1998; Viterbo 1966). The state’s perception in regard to the suppression of 
brigands criminalized the region through orientalist, populist, and sometimes violent 
policies. The Italian unification, the Risorgimento, was an ambitious statecraft project 
that mostly realized its ultimate goal—at least on paper—with the unification of Italy 
in 1861. Yet this glorified historical background to the unification of Italy created the 
rural poor as “the big losers” (Clark, 2009, p. 98). The weak state institutions, therefore, 




employment of radical forces to suppress them or the integration of armed men into the 
social system through the force of elites in the periphery.  
The archival documents studied in this paper show that there were numerous 
repressive and ferocious operations organized by the Kingdom of Italy against those 
brigands to consolidate the state’s authority, restore social order, and guarantee public 
safety, particularly within the first 5 years of the Risorgimento, from 1861 to 1866. 
However, there were also other forms of state intervention. The Italian state 
intervention, which is explored in the following sections, informs us that it was 
concerned with certain sociopolitical issues to differing degrees. Akin to the Ottoman 
case, these principal issues revolved around the concerns of victims, the guarantee of 
public security, and the consolidation of the state’s authority.  
 
4 | RURAL TROUBLES, MODERNIZATION, AND GLOBAL CHANGES IN THE 
OTTOMAN AND ITALIAN SOCIAL LANDSCAPE 
The tax collector, local governor, and military authorities in the rural towns and villages 
vied for the monopolization of power that eventually diminished the capacity of the 
state to consolidate the rule of law and guarantee public safety. A Weberian form of 
bureaucratic dysfunctionality caused a surge of insecurity in the periphery. The most 
striking impact of local misrule was evident in the clientelist and patronage-oriented 
relationships: “Personal cleavages were superimposed upon the organizational ones. 
Each new appointee at each level of government tried to get his own protégés appointed 
to critical posts to safeguard his position against future intrigues” (Karamursal, 1940, 
p. 202; see also Heper, 1980, p. 86). The decisions of local courts and the 
correspondence between Istanbul and the periphery ensured that the Ottoman central 
government recognized corruption and the mistreatment of local people as common 
social problems in both Anatolia and the Balkans (Bogaç, 2003; Haim, 1994; Herzog, 
2003). This was the reason why “the imperial orders sent to provincial centres regularly 
warned judicial and military officials against acts of corruption and oppression, 
indicating the presence of these practices as continual concerns” (Cosgel, Ergene, 
Etkes, & Miceli, 2013, p. 362).  
The modernization of the Ottoman Empire was aimed at overcoming the grip of 
the country with regard to socio-economic, military, legal, and bureaucratic matters. 
The local notables gained important power in the periphery from the 17th century 




the 19th century. The local notables and Mahmud II signed the Sened-i Ittifak (Deed of 
Alliance) after a series of negotiations. The aim of this alliance was to regulate the 
centre–periphery relations, render the polity more effective, and reduce the 
vulnerabilities of victims in the villages through the guarantee of a certain degree of 
authority to the local notables (Barkey, 2008, p. 205; Sadat, 1972; Yaycioglu, 2016). 
However, the Porte weakened the authority of the local rulers in the following decades 
of the 19th century by centralizing the Ottoman polity and creating new democratic 
channels in the form of local assemblies, in which the representatives of the diverse 
communities and the local rulers appointed by the Porte had to work together. On the 
other hand, the attempts at modernization by the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies were 
different from those of the Ottoman Empire. Even though the governance of land was 
the factor that galvanized social dissent in both Sicily and Southern Italy in the first half 
of the 19th century, the attempted reforms were not oriented from bottom to top, but 
the reaction to the failed reforms was. One of the most striking examples of a local 
reaction from the people was evident in a manifesto that was distributed from hand to 
hand 3 days before the birthday of King Ferdinand I, on January 9, 1848, stating the 
following:1 
 
Sicilians! The time of useless supplications is past. Protests, requests and peaceful demonstrations are 
useless. Ferdinand has scorned them all. Are we, a freeborn people, reduced to shackles and misery, to 
delay any longer in reconquering our legitimate rights? To arm, sons of Sicily. The force of the people is 
omnipotent: the unity of the people will bring the fall of the king. The day of 12 January 1848, at dawn, 
will bring the glorious epoch of universal regeneration. 
 
Tilly (1973) rightly demonstrated that modernization does not directly produce 
conflict. However, the wider implications and the governance of modernization 
characterize the ups and downs of this process. From this standpoint, the fundamental 
issues at the core of the social dissent in both Southern Italy and the Ottoman Balkans 
were embedded within social injustice, exploitation, and local misrule, which 
marginalized the desperate rural communities afflicted by the great socio-economic 
changes of the 19th century. Northern Italy and the Piedmont region, under the rule of 
the Kingdom of Sardinia, had the most modernized structure in the diverse political 
geography of the Italian peninsula in the 19th century. The commercialized middle and 
                                                          




aristocratic classes in Piedmont stimulated the unification of Italy through state-seeking 
nationalism, against the state-led nationalism of the South by the Bourbon loyalists 
(Tarrow, 1977; Ziblat, 2006, p. 78).  
The great changes in the global economic arena and their impact on the local 
economies created a reaction among the peasants. The Ottoman Empire’s centralization 
philosophy in this period was aimed at responding to the concerns of peasants through 
increasing the capacity of central authority in the periphery, in order to deter the 
deteriorating administration and the social pressure of local elites over the dissident 
peasant community. As happened in other regions, the area of cultivated land and 
agricultural production was increasing in correlation with the rise in consumer demand.  
The global developments in rural economy and the implications of modern 
agricultural cultivation also caused a surge in consumption and production in the 19th 
century. However, the increase in agricultural production did not eliminate rural dissent. 
The economic degeneration was conflated with political dissent when the ethnic and 
religious concerns of the Balkan communities lessened the attachment of the people to 
Ottomanism and Ottoman rule. Eventually, this will for dismemberment spurred their 
quest to establish an independent political entity. Transportation gained strategic 
importance due to its accumulative force over economic capital in the 19th century. 
Compared to Western Europe, rural Anatolia in the Ottoman Empire lacked a well-
developed railway system. Even though the Balkans was smaller than Anatolia in terms 
of geographical size, the difference in track mileage between Anatolia and the Balkans 
was not very great. However, the capital to construct these railway lines depended on a 
supply of finance from European financiers, which eventually increased the economic 
dependence of the Ottoman Empire on the European powers (Quataert, 2000, pp. 118–
120). The ability of the Ottoman state to tax its subjects was germane to understanding 
the attempted revolts that occurred in both Anatolia and the Balkans (Aytekin, 2013). 
For example, the application of the equality principle enforced by the Ottoman 
Empire’s secular law system to the collection of taxes in order to consolidate social 
justice frustrated the privileged Muslim notables in the 1834 peasants’ revolt in 
Palestine (Beinin, 2001, p. 33). However, the violent tax revolts in the 19th century 
were limited in Anatolia and the Middle East when compared to the Balkans. In the 
19th century, the social class organization of the peasantry in the Balkans created 
greater dissent in Istanbul than other revolts that occurred in North Africa, the Middle 




the scarcity of territory became enmeshed, by the leading ideologues of the national 
uprisings, with the instigation of nationalistic sentiment.  
 The invasion of Sicily by various kingdoms from the 13th century onwards 
alienated peasants and their concerns were not taken seriously either by the invaders or 
the local notables, who enriched themselves by exploiting the peasant labour force. In 
the early 19th century, the deteriorating social conditions of the peasants compelled the 
abolition of feudalism through laws implemented in 1812 and 1816; however, these 
regulations did not bring about a major progression in the everyday life of peasants 
(Jamieson, 1999, p. 12). The lands distributed as part of these new legal changes were 
distant from the towns and not as fertile as those in the central and northern parts of 
Italy (Hilowitz, 1976, p. 14). The commercialization of agriculture, a more powerful 
middle class, and a well-connected transportation system in Northern Italy put the 
peasants in a better position when compared to the South. Therefore, in addition to the 
environmental and geographical conditions, the gap between the different social classes 
in Southern Italy was based on the governance of lands, prevalent social injustice 
among the peasants, and the eminent role of local notables in the control of capital. In 
1863, shortly after the unification of Italy, there was no great change in the social 
conditions of peasants. General Alfonso La Marmora explicated the relationship 
between the different social classes in Southern Italy, stating that “… If ignorance and 
ferocity are the characteristics of the inferior class, egoism and intrusion into the 
dominating positions are the so-called features of gabellotti” (Serra, 2009, p. 36). The 
new Italian state and its officials recognized these degenerating social conditions while 
portraying those who were revolting through the lens of cultural relativism, and 
labelling dissidents as criminals and emotional reactionaries (Whelehan, 2014). The 
victory of the ruling classes in the suppression of the peasant revolts in Southern Italy 
also influenced Italy’s poor economic performance (Sereni, 1971). As a result, the 
Risorgimento “remained essentially an element between the Savoy monarchy and the 
urban high class, whereas large segments of the peasant population were, at best 
sceptical about or even fiercely against, the process of unification” (Guiso & Pinotti, 
2013, p. 309). 
In addition to the local dynamics, agricultural production was also under the 
influence of great global changes. The expansion of staple agriculture after the 
American Civil War changed the economic history of the United States, and its impact 




prices paved the way for the expansion of Western cultivation and influenced local 
wheat prices (Harley, 1978). The development of an international economic system 
influenced the agricultural economy through the regulation of wheat production in 
Britain and the USA. This influence was the start of a series of events that triggered 
more global reactions in rural areas. The cheaper grain brought about lower rents 
throughout Europe and increased real wages in Britain, whereas it diminished other 
places because of different trade policies as well as political and agricultural divisions 
among European countries (O’Rourke, 1997; Winders, 2009). Yet the main 
characteristic in the outcome of cheap American grain was the destabilization of the 
European agricultural economy and the impoverishment of rural communities, which 
resonated dreadfully in the Mediterranean rural landscape. This sinister impact had a 
negative effect on the production of fruits in the region (Morilla Critz, Olmstead, & 
Rhode, 1999).  
The economic transformation in the 19th century combined with the 
technological developments and canalized the leading forces to implement capitalist 
policies fiercely. This formidable combination constituted the pillars of the liberal and 
industrial economic agenda of the imperialist powers: “The long history of ‘capital-
intensive’, epoch-making innovations—above all, the early modern shipbuilding–
cartographic revolution, the nineteenth century steam engine and the internal 
combustion engine of the twentieth century—has indeed been marked by the 
geographically specific concentration of capital in particular places, above all in the 
heartlands of the Dutch, British and American hegemonic regimes” (Moore, 2010, p. 
393). Transportation in the 19th century was developed by means of steam locomotives 
in addition to the construction of railways. All these changes connected different 
economic geographies and eventually caused a surge in the expansion of the capitalist 
system. The integration of the Southern Italian peasantry into the rapid changes in the 
global agricultural economy was dominated by the political aspirations of the new 
regime in Northern Italy, hence undermining the peasant reaction against the unification 
of Italy. Unlike the North, in Southern Italy the local notables stimulated the increase 
in agricultural production by exploiting peasants, and reaped the benefits of this 
integration by taking the governance of lands under their control. In doing so, the new 
regime established its implicit dictatorship over Southern Italy by leaving the explicit 




It was not a coincidence, therefore, that the local reaction against exploitation 
and social injustice promulgated violence and brigandage activities. Dal Lago (2005) 
has developed an important framework by comparing social and rural dissent in South 
America with Southern Italy in the 19th century, arguing that, even though a certain 
number of differences existed between these two geographies, the role of local elites 
and the exploitative labour system in both places deepened social degeneration. The 
socio-economic decline of the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century and its struggle to 
relieve the rural population, interfaced with pressures posed by the global changes in 
the control of agricultural production. The tensions, particularly in the Ottoman 
Balkans, between the Christian and Muslim peasants and the notable classes 
crystallized disputes over land within the context of local dissent (Yaycioglu, 2016, p. 
30). Even though the struggles of the Ottoman Empire to draft social reforms were more 
aspiring and deliberate than those of the Northern Italian politicians, the rise of 
nationalism brought new difficulties to the other side of the Adriatic Sea, while Italian 
unification aimed at undermining the reaction of local people in the southern part of the 
country. The state interventions in the Ottoman and Italian social landscapes remained 
under the influence of regional and global changes in one way or another. The state 
power was under pressure to regain political and social control over its territories. 
However, this struggle of both states created different state intervention models, and 
none of these interventions either tackled the source of dissent or relieved the traumatic 
conditions of the peasants completely. 
 
5 | THE OTTOMAN STATE INTERVENTION: VICTIMS, SECURITY, AND 
AUTHORITY  
This section is based on archival documents that demonstrate how the Ottoman state 
responded through victim-centred, security-centred, and authority-centred state 
intervention. Victim-centred state intervention was at issue when people were injured 
or fatally victimized in the prevention of banditry. The case of Hüseyin reveals the 
generous Ottoman policies to provide state support for the victims. Hüseyin was a 
zabtiye, working in the police force in Mitrovica, located in the northern part of Kosovo. 
After his assassination by bandits, a letter issued on March 12, 1859 put Hüseyin’s 
family on a salary immediately and ordered the arrest of the offenders.2 Hurşid, who 
                                                          




was also a zaptiye, lost his life while chasing the bandits of Montenegro and Austria. A 
salary was immediately assigned to his family by the Ottoman government.3 A similar 
decision was made for the family of Ibrahim, who lost his life in a similar manner to 
Hurşid.4 The common point of all these documents is that the deaths of law enforcement 
officers are narrated elaborately, and they demonstrate empathy with the relatives of 
the victims.  
Assigning a salary was not the only practice of victim-centred state intervention. 
Decisions about compensation depended on the evaluation of each case separately. The 
case of Agrafa, noted below, demonstrates how the incidents were assessed on a case-
by-case basis, according to the outcome in each case. Agrafa, a mountainous region in 
central Greece, hosted notorious bandit groups. The bandits were at an advantageous in 
these remote areas, which provided considerable scope for shelter and hiding places. 
Furthermore, the bandits in these highly inaccessible areas managed to defeat various 
Ottoman army forces, as happened in 1867, when a junior officer in the armed forces 
and five soldiers lost their lives while fighting bandits. The Porte decided to give some 
money to the sons of the soldiers, but a regular salary was not assigned.5 Unlike the 
Agrafa incident, a year later, the Porte put the family of Yahya Ağa on a salary after he 
lost his life while chasing bandits. Yahya Ağa was a high-ranked army officer, in the 
Tabur Ağası (battalion network).6 If we take into account that the Empire was running 
a budget deficit, particularly after the second half of the 19th century, the cost of 
fighting the bandits and compensating the families of victims aggravated the already 
fragile financial situation.  
The peasants in Nikšić, located in central Montenegro, became victims of the 
bandits twice. First, their houses were burnt down. Second, in Geçkal, a new group of 
bandits seized stocks of foodstuffs and grain that had been sent to the peasants by 
Ottoman officials from Trebinje, located in the southern part of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, 41 miles away from Nikšić.7 While the bandits’ attacks leveraged panic 
in the region, the Ottoman social system sought alternative methods to help victims in 
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the periphery when they were victimized. In a very similar case, when the peasants in 
the village of Azdovik, in Herzegovina, were afflicted by bandit attacks, numerous 
donations were implemented by the central Ottoman government to ameliorate the 
deteriorating social situation in the village.8 When, in 1860, bandits burnt down 17 
houses and a tower in Trebinje, the Porte allocated a budget to reconstruct those 17 
houses and the tower.9 Yet again, the Porte sent food subsistence and other logistical 
goods to the peasants of Nova Varoš in eastern Serbia and Višegrad in eastern Bosnia–
Herzegovina when they were attacked by bandits.10 
In 1859, the Ottoman Empire published a decree to ameliorate deprivation in 
the villages that was suffered as a result of raids by bandits during the internal social 
upheavals. The decree offered significant benefits to the victimized peasants by 
abolishing tax payments for 8 years and returning the already collected taxes that had 
been charged mistakenly. To this end, the central government in Istanbul ordered the 
dispatch of defters (tax registers) to obtain the names of taxpayers and reschedule the 
tax collection.11 These forms of compensation, supported by the state, also encouraged 
certain individuals from the reaya to prepare a petition and ask for the help of the Porte. 
Peasants rearing ships and goats had to pay an additional tax annually, which was called 
ondalık. Halid, one of these peasants from Salonika who was obliged to pay the ondalık, 
was economically victimized by bandits. However, he did not hesitate to ask the Porte 
to compensate him for his loss.12 
The two documents13 of the Şuray-ı Devlet (the Council of State) that are 
discussed below are significant materials conveying the message that the Ottoman 
Empire pardoned the tax obligations of communities in Bosnia when the residents of 
these communities were victimized in attacks by bandits. The documents were signed 
by the members of the Council of State, who were Mehmet Sahib, Mustafa Nazmi, and 
Ibrahim Edib, and sent to the local communities in Travnik, which is in present-day 
central Bosnia. The community of Belive was devastatingly ill-treated as bandits raided 
the houses of residents and seized their cattle. The tax on approximately 10,000 
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kilograms of grain and the cash payment of tax, which was equal to 877 qurush and 22 
para,14 were all pardoned. What is more, the peasants of Bubek and Kabul from the 
town of Novi Pazar became refugees in Serbia due to attacks by bandits. The letters 
also confirmed the exemption of tax from these people as well as the mültezims who 
collected the tax from the peasants on behalf of the Porte. 
Victim-centred state intervention was not the only method applied by the 
Ottoman Empire. Banditry also posed a significant threat to public safety, so security-
centred measures were employed by the Porte from time to time. The security-centred 
form of state intervention was more prevalent when there was a local reaction against 
Ottoman authority. The next case,15 which I will present below, shows that the Ottoman 
Empire applied both instruments of social justice and repressive methods at the same 
time to suppress the bandits. The people of Karşu Peyve in Bosnia, who were residents 
of around ten different villages, resisted the Ottoman Empire because of tax concerns. 
On the other hand, attacks by bandits created agitation in these villages. The vulnerable 
peasants asked for help from the central government of the Ottoman Empire to fight the 
bandits. In return, they declared that they would accept the superior authority of the 
Porte and its local governance, and that they would abandon their attempted uprisings 
against Ottoman authority. The central government sent armies into this region, 
suppressed the bandits and guaranteed the safety of the villages. Ten leaders of the 
community were invited to the Porte. Upon their arrival, the leaders of the community 
received presents. These gifts even included seeds to produce grain. Accordingly, the 
governor of Bosnia was also informed by the central government in Istanbul regarding 
these developments.  
The two forms of state intervention mentioned above—victim-centred and 
security-centred—offer important hints with regard to understanding the reaction of 
state and society in difficult times. However, the last form of state intervention, 
authority-centred state intervention, is both radical in its use of force and less flexible 
in its orientation towards entailing a progressive society and a negotiable governing 
model. The primary reason for this distinction lies in the perception of state authority, 
which identifies certain bandits as an existential threat directed against the social and 
political order. This drastic perception about the bandits also stimulated the Ottoman 
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state to implement radical policies that were both destructive and ultimate. The two 
examples briefly presented in the next paragraphs, the Cretan revolt in 1866 and the 
April Uprising in 1875, demonstrate the radical vision of authority-centred state 
intervention. 
Political dissent in Crete became much more intense with Greek independence 
in 1829. The religious support for a revolt against Ottoman rule not only increased the 
motivation of the bandits, but also created new conflicts between the religious 
authorities and the governing cadre of the state. One of the most prominent examples 
of this conflict occurred in the Sanjak of Chania, which was the most important region 
in the Vilayet of Crete. The island had already become notorious for Ottoman 
governance, given its attempted uprisings from the early 1820s onwards. Since that 
time, the resistance had been repressed with bloody Ottoman attacks. The revolt in 
Crete erupted and gained an international character when around 300 armed insurgents 
and 600 civilians tragically lost their lives in the surrounded Arkadi Monastery in 1866, 
after the intervention of Ottoman forces (Senisik, 2011, p. 76). The monastery crumbled 
when barrels of gunpowder in the church were set on fire. The spread of news about 
this atrocity across Europe, in various journals, magazines and newspapers, helped to 
delegitimize Ottoman rule on the island (Stillman, 1874, p. 87). Authority-centred state 
intervention was determined to succeed at the expense of tragic outcomes, as happened 
in the case of Arkadi Monastery. Hence, the Ottoman victory in the region also signified 
the erosion of zones of resistance and the restoration of state authority.  
The April Uprising in 1875 dramatically weakened Ottoman state power in the 
Balkans. The well-planned preparations for an uprising among the Bulgarians 
intensified in the autumn of 1875, when the fragilities of Ottoman authority crystallized 
during the Bosnian Uprising (1831–1832) and the Herzegovina Uprising (1852–1862). 
Todor Kableshkov, who was a young and ambitious nationalist, educated at Istanbul’s 
Lycée Impérial Ottoman de Galata-Sérai, led the attempted uprising with his band in 
April 1876 (Perry, 1993, pp. 31 and 245). Even though the number of victims remained 
a disputable issue among the conflicting factions, the Ottoman casualties were severe 
in the first half of the uprising, which began in the final days of April 1876. In a couple 
of days, the conflict expanded virally into central Bulgaria. The response of the Porte, 
the authority of which had already been defied formidably in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
against the Bulgarian insurgents and bandit groups was relentless. The Porte’s reaction 




more, the attacks by the insurgent groups on bridges, roads, telegraph lines, and 
government buildings16 radicalized the Porte into taking punitive measures. The 
Ottoman Empire had already become convinced that it should respond harshly to the 
rebels when the news about the victimization of Muslims and civilians reached the 
Porte. The uprising was controlled with bloody attacks by irregular soldiers, 
bashibozuks, particularly in Batak and neighbouring villages, which were severely 
afflicted by the bloodshed and terror of the bashibozuks. Thousands of people lost their 
lives tragically in the bashibozuk assaults. However, the malgovernance of the Porte 
became more palpable internationally when the bashibozuk violence drew furious 
attention abroad, because of the widespread atrocities in the region. What is more, the 
journalists and diplomats who visited the locations of the uprisings narrated and 
reported the violence eloquently. The foreign media, particularly The Times and the 
London Daily News, conveyed those bloodstained events on their pages (Reid, 2000, p. 
453). Thus, authority-centred state intervention is distinguished from victim-centred 
and security-centred state intervention because of its radical nature and the persistent 
revolt of the communities against the ruling regime. Therefore, both the revolts within 
the communities and the radical interventions of the state led to traumatic and iconic 
events.  
 
6 | THE ITALIAN STATE INTERVENTION: VICTIMS, SECURITY, AND 
AUTHORITY  
This section examines the three forms of Italian state intervention. Victims, both from 
the civilian population and state officials, received different types of state support. The 
policies to guarantee public safety were also part of the agenda of the Italian state, which 
implemented harsh legal measures and social control through a security-centred state 
intervention. Finally, the Kingdom of Italy, as a newly established state, embraced 
radical suppression policies when it perceived that its ultimate authority was under 
threat. Thus, the Italian state organized a number of attacks against the rebel towns and 
zones of resistance that did not recognize state authority. The attacks of the Kingdom 
of Italy demonstrate that authority-centred state intervention was both traumatic and 
iconic in the state-building process. In the following paragraphs, I will analyse how 
state intervention revolved around the differing priorities of the authority of the state. 
                                                          




Yet, similar to the Ottoman case, these priorities concentrated on the three main targets: 
(i) victims; (ii) security; and (iii) authority. All these three state interventions 
determined the course of the state reaction while responding to the dreadful challenges 
posed to the state.  
The claims of Luigi de Benedictis offer important indications with which to 
conceive the state’s perception with regard to brigandage. This perception among 
Italian officialdom influenced the state reaction against brigandage and banditry. When 
we look at the claims raised by Benedictis in 1862, the impact of cultural relativism is 
evident. Furthermore, there was an alarming psychosocial perception about the rise of 
brigandage activities that would categorize the newly established regime in the class of 
uncivilized nations.  
There was also a growing resentment against the new rule in Sicily. The forces 
resisting the Kingdom of Italy did not remain silent. A manifesto was declared in 
Palermo on October 29, 1862 to mobilize people against the new authority on the island. 
The emotional discourse of the manifesto was both dramatic and straightforward. One 
of its first paragraphs was devoted to the social and cultural dichotomy between the 
North and South by means of the following statements: “In Turin, they sing, laugh, 
dance, feast; in the provinces of Southern Italy, there is crying out, shooting, suffering 
because of the devastations of troops and brigands.”17 Moreover, the letter continued 
by expressing the great concern regarding the new city council’s priorities, which made 
the council busy with sending presents to Maria Pia of Savoy when she got married to 
Luís I of Portugal: “… And these people know very well that the municipal council of 
Palermo, which does not pay the debts of the Commune, is able to find money to prepare 
and send gifts to the royal princesses to imitate the Pope who sent his wedding gift to 
the daughter of Vittorio Emanuele II when she married the King of Portugal.”18  
The public legitimacy of the Kingdom of Italy was also premised on its ability 
to provide social assistance for vulnerable groups, including both the civilian 
population and state forces, who were injured, killed, or economically ruined while 
fighting bandits and brigands. The nine different decisions explain how the state strove 
to recover these vulnerabilities through embracing a victim-centred state intervention. 
For example, at its meeting held on January 24, 1864, the commission for the repression 
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of brigandage granted premiums and subsidies:19 these grants denoted the financial 
support of the Kingdom of Italy towards defeating brigandage activities with ease, 
through giving money to those people who cooperated with the state in this process or 
who were victimized because of their cooperation. 
After 3 years of these decisions by the committee, there was still an intensive 
distribution of funding among those civilians who were either the victims of brigandage 
or who had received awards and prizes because of their collaboration with the authority 
of the state. For instance, one of the decisions made in Basilicata declared the award of 
“425 lira and its division into three pieces to be given to Vitiello Gerardo, Cesare 
Giovanni, Muro Lucano for presenting the brigand Vitiello Francescantonio to the 
justice”.20 This state support was also used effectively to support soldiers. Thousands 
of soldiers received medals because of their roles in the suppression of brigands. Cesari 
(1922, p. 167) reported that four gold medals, 2,375 silver medals, and 5,012 Medals 
of Honour had been distributed. The number of cases of distribution of money prizes in 
different places and at different times, particularly during the long 1860s, show that 
victim-centred state intervention was one of the main methods adopted while fighting 
the brigands. However, it was not the only one. The following paragraphs point out that 
security-centred and authority-centred state interventions widened the scope of state 
authority, paved the way for state violence, and limited the fundamental rights of 
dissident communities. 
The state reaction against the brigands and bandits was predicated on the 
possibility of their success as the sole ruling authority, which would delegitimize the 
power of the newly established state after the fall of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. 
Accordingly, the sometimes reactionary attitudes of the citizens and bandits towards 
the state forces fostered the degree of the harsh decisions taken by state authority to rule 
the region as an independent and omnipotent agency. The verdict delineated below is a 
crucial example demonstrating how the intervention of the state was aimed at the 
extension of its authority over the entire community in Siracusa in Sicily, through 
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raising concerns related to public safety and the legitimacy of state authority: 
 
Some unsavoury people were committing themselves to engaging in certain acts, which cannot be found 
in a civilized country. Stones were thrown at the Band of the National Guard while they were playing in 
the marina on Sunday. Some people stopped in the Theatre for a political demonstration on Monday, the 
following week. These are not only the responsibilities of the insensitive people who committed these 
acts, but also the citizens who tolerated such acts and eventually fostered the concealment of the 
Authority.  
The honour of the City concerns all of you. 
Any person who, in any way, attempts to change the public order either through acts, or words, 
will be arrested or taken to the disposal of the Military Tribunal in Catania or Messina. Those who know 
the perpetuators, but do not collaborate with the Authority will also be denounced in the municipal and 
military authority according to its illegal outcome. 
Denouncing the disturbers is a requirement of Patriotism whereas hiding them is pusillanimity 
and it is eventually equivalent to complicity.21  
 
The concerns about public safety increased other measures within the context of 
security-centred state intervention. Unsurprisingly, within a week of the incident in 
Siracusa, Filippo Brignone, the highest authority responsible for the mobilization of 
troops in Sicily, claimed that “the military represents the government so everyone must 
be respectful towards the military as if it were the government”. In the following 
statements in the same document, he underlines that every harsh measure needs to be 
taken to defeat the brigands, and he insists on the treatment of every resident as a 
brigand if that person bears arms.22  
In line with the assertions raised by Brignone, the mayors played a crucial role 
in the suppression of the brigands through collaboration with the military authorities. 
Emilio Pallavicini’s letter to the mayors of the provinces of Terra di Lavoro, Aquila, 
Molise, Benevento, Salerno, Avellino, and Basilicata is discernible proof of this 
collaboration. More importantly, his letter ordered crucial duties for the municipalities 
in the interests of public safety by reporting the locations of bandits and brigands, 
through forcing the relatives of the bandits to collaborate with the law enforcement 
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agencies, and even considering assigning a salary or giving money prizes upon 
receiving their confessions regarding the bandits’ hideouts.23 
One of the remarkable concerns with regard to public safety was the complete 
elimination of arms, excluding those in the possession of the state forces. Hence 
Eberhardt, the colonel who was responsible for the repression of brigands, claimed that 
the disarmament of the civilians in Agrigento (located in southern Sicily) was an 
obligation for public safety. The security-centred state intervention used, prima facie, 
the ‘public safety’ concern to legitimize its intervention. However, the harsh reaction 
of the state even against civilians shows that the state had a different agenda beyond the 
public safety concern.24 
In addition to the victim-centred and security-centred state interventions, the 
Kingdom of Italy also applied the authority-centred state intervention, which was 
radical in its reaction, similar to the case of the Ottoman Empire. The massacre at 
Pondelandolfo represents one of the most prominent examples of state crime, when 
authority-centred state intervention was imposed both zealously and brutally.  
The villagers and brigands resisted and captured a group of soldiers when they 
arrived in Casalduni to seek fugitives: 41 of the soldiers were then killed, on August 
11, 1861 (Di Fiore, 2014, pp. 338–339). The retaliation against the killings paved the 
way for a radical state reaction, which was neither proportional nor prudent. 
Pondelandolfo and Casalduni, which were 4 miles away from each other, were sacked 
by the Piedmontese military forces on August 14, 1861. The development of the 
massacre demonstrates that the aim of the military force went further than taking control 
in the city: “Leave not a stick standing in Pondelandolfo and Casalduni” was the ruling 
code of the massacre when General Enrico Cialdini ordered Colonel Geatano Negri to 
suppress these two unsubdued towns (De Matteo, 2000, p. 210). Carlo Margolfo, from 
the Italian Royal Army, narrated the carnage eloquently, conveying how a set of 
planned and yet violent attacks convulsed the region dramatically: 
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We entered the town and immediately began shooting the priests and any men we came across. Then, the 
soldiers started sacking, and finally we set fire to the town … What a terrible scene it was, and the heat 
was so great that you could not stand it there. And what a noise those poor devils made whose fate it was 
to die roasted under the ruins of the houses. But while the fire raged we had everything we wanted—
chickens, bread, wine, capons. We were short of nothing. (Duggan, 2008, p. 223) 
 
After the troops turned to Benevento, Colonel Gaetano Negri prepared a report 
and sent it to the provincial governor on the following day, stating: “At dawn yesterday 
justice was done to Pontelandolfo and Casalduni. They are still burning” (Duggan, 
2008, p. 224). Even though the exact number of deaths remains uncertain, hundreds of 
people died on the night of the massacre, 3,000 people lost their homes, and many 
escaped. Also, 573 people were put on trial and punished with either life imprisonment 
or hard labour (Duggan, 2008, p. 224). The Italian authorities eradicated the bandits at 
the expense of civilian victims. Indeed, their attempt contained parallel motives when 
compared with the Ottoman authorities, as was presented above with regard to the April 
Uprising and Arkadi monastery incidents. 
 
7 | CONCLUSIONS 
The suppression of bandits also instigated the reaction of the local community. This 
dilemma created its own sociocultural paradoxes, which lured the local agencies and 
state authorities into vying for power. Crime, violence, and social exploitation were the 
constant variables that became embedded in the everyday lives of rural communities 
during the process of state restoration and the state foundation process in the Ottoman 
and Southern Italian social spectra. The perplexing relationship between the peasants 
and the bandits did not just criminalize the rural communities. More vehemently, and 
in both cases, the same relationship prompted radical state suppression when the central 
and highest state authority perceived the reaction in the periphery as a perilous risk 
directed against its own authority. It is clear in hindsight that there are diverse reasons 
for the upsurge of bandits in the Ottoman Balkans and the Italian peninsula during the 
19th century. Yet the common reasons, which rendered banditry epidemic, were 
predicated on the dynamics of social injustice in rural governance.  
The victim-centred state intervention prioritized state support and event-based 
social protection for the victims. The salaries assigned to the victims and their relatives, 




symbols of state power, which were also intended to increase trust in the state’s 
authority and institutions. However, victim-centred state intervention offered mostly 
temporary solutions. Neither the Ottoman Empire nor the Kingdom of Italy drafted the 
necessary agrarian reforms to change the dynamics of socio-economic life 
fundamentally and to make social justice the ruling principle. Indeed, the rural dissent 
and banditry resonated as the outcomes of social injustice and state misrule. Unlike 
victim-centred state intervention, security-centred state intervention prioritized public 
safety and employed the law enforcement agencies to guarantee public safety. The 
Ottoman and Italian state authorities conceived many of the attempts at resistance as 
the product of banditry and brigandage within the context of security-centred state 
intervention. This perception also fostered the criminalization of the dissident 
communities in the zones where the uprisings were taking place. In fact, an important 
part, if not all, of these uprisings were primarily related to the great social dissent and 
the withering hopes of the peasants with regard to agrarian reform and social progress. 
Finally, authority-centred state intervention was the most radical form among the 
various intervention models, because of the conviction that the social and political order 
of the state was under ultimate threat, and that the same threat needed to be obviated 
prima facie. More importantly, the ultimate threat against state authority was used to 
legitimize the destruction of the zones of resistance, and even led to massacres to 
suppress the uprisings or to execute revenge in the cases presented above. The Ottoman 
Empire and the Kingdom of Italy employed authority-centred state intervention when 
both states perceived that there was no more effective way to subdue the resisting 
communities. This determination also created radical changes in the demographic, 
social, and cultural structure of the zones of resistance through the massacres, in the 
Italian case, at Bronte, Pontelandolfo, and Casalduni, and, in the Ottoman case, with 
regard to the April Uprising and Arkadi Monastery (see Table 1).  
 
<INSERT TABLE 1 NEAR HERE>  
 
The victim-centred, security-centred and authority-centred forms of state 
intervention could not eradicate the source of the social problem, which was not 
primarily addressed by these intervention models. Nevertheless, the three forms of 
Ottoman and Italian state intervention consolidated the central state authority in the 




forces, rather than on the principles of social justice and the rule of law. The paradox 
of state intervention, thus, prevailed in the Ottoman and Italian cases because the state 
interventions provided a temporary relief in the short term, while leading to longer and 
more formidable periods of contention in both the periphery and the centre. A 
comparison of the Ottoman and Italian cases shows that the actors of peasant society 
were not passive figures of the periphery. In fact, their reactionary stance was a 
remarkable indication when they were subject to injustice to such an extent that the 
rural communities determined the course of state policies and the degree of state 
intervention. This is another reason why the characterization of bandits with strong 
narratives and attempts to resist finds its central place in folklore, poems, and ballads. 
Indeed, the bandits cannot be reduced merely to the outcome of political and social 
dissent in contentious societies. The collective memory of peasants who disseminate 
the stories of bandits through ballads, stories, and poems points to the direction of future 
research in this field. In addition to the importance of cultural materials, comparative 
research also needs to take the cross-sectional archival materials into account to explore 
the embedded injustice in the everyday lives of rural society, and the form of state 
intervention, which has determining implications and outcomes for both the structure 
of the state and of society. In this context, delving into the factual and yet tragic cases 
in the court documents and military and state archival sources might open new gates to 
an exploration of the complex social and cultural dynamics of vulnerable rural 
communities in different periods of history. 
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TABLE 1 The forms of state intervention in the Ottoman Empire and the Kingdom of Italy   
 Victim-centred state intervention Security-centred 
state intervention 
Authority-centred 
state intervention  Local people  State officials 
The Ottoman state 
intervention 
    





The Italian state 
intervention 
 





Principal concerns Event-based social welfare system and 
social protection  
Public safety in the name of state 
legitimacy 
Ultimate submissiveness to the 
political and social order of state 
authority 
Implications Economic, logistic, and infrastructural 
support for the victims  
Law enforcement (police and 
military force) and legal measures 
Radical change in the zones of 
resistance  
Outcomes Recognition of and collaboration with the 
state power as the ruling authority and the 
increase of trust among local people and 
state officials towards the state institutions 
Criminalization of the zones of 
resistance and clashes, ranging 
from small-scale to large-scale, 
between the conflicting factions  
Traumatic and iconic state 
interventions resulting in the 
erosion of zones of resistance  
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